Somalia and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States:
Gender Equality as the Key to Peace-building and State-building Success

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Abstract

The current methods which development agencies use to engage with fragile and conflict-affected states are in need of serious improvement. Transitioning out of fragility is a decades-long political process that requires a significant investment from multiple global partners. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, or the “New Deal,” is a landmark global policy agreement that seeks to change traditional development cooperation from a donor-to-recipient transfer model to that of an equal partnership between governments and development partners, thereby seeking to reinforce country-owned and country-led strategies out of fragility. The Federal Republic of Somalia is one of several self-identified fragile and conflicted-affected member states participating in the g7+ New Deal Pilot Program. Since the 1960s, Somali conceptions of gender identity have undergone substantial changes as a result of conflict and peace-making processes. Having made a substantial commitment to the prioritization of women and girls’ inclusion in the nation’s peace-building and state-building objectives, Somalia’s effort has been praised for its promotion of gender equality. There is significant literature on the United Nations Security Council Landmark Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and which supports gender equality in peace-building and state-building processes. However, this article will use evidence from Somalia to showcase how liberal feminist and standpoint feminist programs are privileged over post-structural and institutional feminist perspectives that would otherwise drastically transform the New Deal’s implementation and its potential for success.

Keywords: Somalia, New Deal, fragile states, feminist theory, gender, post-conflict reconstruction, international aid, peace-building, state-building, sexual and gender-based violence
Introduction

The United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda sets out a reinvigorated framework for international development aid agencies, governments, and local actors, marking a new era for development. Among the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), SDG16: Peace, Justice, and Institutions calls for the international community to change how they engage with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) in upcoming peace-building and state-building (PBSB) efforts (Cordaid 2015). The new agenda for bringing peace to the world’s most conflict-affected areas is emboldened by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal), a landmark global policy agreement which calls upon international development and aid actors to align and coordinate PBSB projects in FCAS with nationally identified needs and aspirations (IDPS, 2012). The New Deal is characterized by its foundational Five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) and enforces the idea that pathways out of fragility must be country-led and country-owned (IDPS, 2012). For this reason, many scholars assert that the New Deal represents a fresh and notable reorientation and rebalancing of power between the Global North and Global South (Kumuyi, 2017; Horst, 2017; Hearn, 2016; Goodwin, 2014).

Noting this disruption to the orthodox approaches of development in FCAS, there is greater anticipation that feminist precedence enshrined in international law and policy documentation will be a defining component of local, national, and global PBSB projects, potentially demonstrating an authentic dedication to meaningfully engaging women and girls – who have otherwise been ignored – into development practice. However, following the debatable success of the 2000-2015 United Nations Millennium Development Goals, feminist scholars caution that these political, economic, and social transformation processes may not only continue to exclude women and girls, but are also likely to miss “one of the most significant systems shaping power relations worldwide
– gender” (El-Bushra, 2012; Goodwin, 2014; EARF, 2017, p. 8). Though international development institutions often rhetorically acknowledge the ways in which traditional development efforts rely on and reproduce gendered power relations, these institutions still fail to identify, analyze, and adapt to countries’ contexts in their attempt to influence these inequalities – a critical factor when programming for inclusive PBSB in FCAS (Cordaid, 2015; EARF, 2017).

The Federal Republic of Somalia represents one of seven self-identified FCAS that are part of the g7+ pilot program, which have all made several commitments toward completing their New Deal mandate (IDPS, 2012). In this forward-looking paper, I explore whether Somalia’s promise to engage women and girls alongside men and boys is a critical component in all aspects of their PBSB objectives, and how Somalia will comprehensively apply the conception of gender equality into its research, policy, and project initiatives (Horst, 2017). Though gender approaches were once ridiculed or thought inconsequential to sustainable development, the convergence of global perceptions of gender as it relates to security, governance, and economics as a determining factor in alleviating violent conflict, reducing widespread abject poverty and remedying state instability signifies a unique transformation and characterization of the next era for sustainable PBSB outcomes in FCAS (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Given this notable shift in attitudes toward gender and development, it is vital to triangulate relevant scholarly debates with data and policy specific to Somalia in order to study the likeliness for significant outcomes in PBSB. In the first section, this work will introduce the New Deal, and will then list relevant feminist theoretical positions as they relate conflict and peacebuilding to the conception of gender in Somali history and identity. Next, it will examine the implementation of two of the five PSGs in Somalia: PSG1: legitimate politics and PSG2: strengthening people’s security. Lastly, recommendations for SDG16 and New Deal success will be provided in the discussion and conclusion section.
What is The New Deal and Why Somalia?

The New Deal was negotiated by the *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (IDPS). The IDPS is the singular “international multi-constituency platform” for PBSB and is composed of the g7+ group of self-identified countries in fragile, conflicted-affected situations (Hearn, 2017, p. 10). Functionally, the New Deal uniquely calls for FCAS and their development partners to follow the principles and methodologies of *F.O.C.U.S.* (strategies for country-led pathways out of fragility) and *T.R.U.S.T.* (instruments to ensure aid effectiveness), as well as for the PSGs to “broaden the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance” (IDPS, 2012; UN, 2015, p. 1). Along with SDG16, these principles serve as a guide towards strengthening the FCAS’ national institutions by linking international cooperation with local organizations whose work seeks to prevent violence, promote democracy and champion inclusive policy-making (UN, 2015).

Somalia collapsed in 1991, falling in and out of civil war for more than two decades. Mobilized by inter-clan dynamics and conflicts, war in Somalia continues today, reinforcing a complicated nexus of severe and deeply rooted implications for Somali women and men (Bradbury, 2009). In addition to infrastructural, institutional and social destruction, the experience of the Somali people has been devastating – people have been robbed, killed, abandoned, genitally mutilated, raped, forcibly married, and/or coerced into sexual slavery (Horst, 2017). Despite its pledge to the MDGs, the *2015 UNDP Human Development Report* ranked Somalia among the lowest countries globally on the *Gender Inequality Index*, with a rating of 0.776 (Walker, 2017). However, the case of Somalia in the context of the New Deal is still significant because it is the only g7+ pilot country that has aligned its national priorities and budget with the PSGs (Donais et al., 2016). Therefore, although Somalia is considered to be failed state, there is wide consensus by
the International Network on Conflict and Fragility and g7+ members that Somalia is successfully navigating through New Deal processes thus far (Donais et al., 2016). Since Somalia is proving to be a model for g7+ countries, it is important to analyze the degree to which gender considerations have been actualized in the nation’s New Deal implementation in the pursuit of PBSB.

**Theoretical Debates**

Although conflict is logically understood as “the opposite of development,” where “war is development in reverse,” constructivist thinkers argue that conflict is inherent to development (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2016, p. 415). Indeed, when inquiring into war historically and sociologically, violence can be a double-edged sword. In the same way that the causes of conflict catalyze the breakdown of society and state, in an era of rapid globalization, conflict exposes the social, political, and economic relations from which a foundation for a contextualized PBSB strategy can be appropriately formed (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012; Kaldor, 2006). This is not to say constructivists prefer conflict, but rather that the customary realist blueprint for PBSB – which prioritizes fiscal liberalization and urgent democratic reform in FCAS – can be avoided.

Since the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security (S/RES/1325), PBSB carries a new energy, in that it seeks to secure peace and institutional growth by means of gender mainstreaming (Baranyi, 2008). The consensus among feminist scholarship has not proven unanimous, however, with distinct perspectives emanating from liberal feminism, standpoint feminism, post-structural and institutional feminism. The friction arising from these feminist camps often reveals itself in the midst of debate critiquing Northern governments, donors, and international development agencies’ traditional imposition over Southern states when engaging in ‘development’ (El-Bushra, 2012). Thematically, the
The majority of liberal feminist scholarship aims to address women’s invisibility in PBSB by removing legal obstacles to women’s inequality (Hudson, 2005). It has been criticized for its “gender-blindness” because it fits into the mold of realism by merely calling for the enlarged participation of women in PBSB processes by achieving targets or meeting quotas (El-Bushra, 2012, p. 4; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Moreover, it can be convincingly argued that liberal feminism lacks the radical potential to challenge and change oppressive top-down PBSB systems because it uncritically integrates women into mainstream security approaches without “questioning the dominant assumptions” of realism (Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 55). By masquerading as being in the “pursuit of a norm equality,” liberal feminism reproduces “existing meanings of what constitutes human kind” and further homogenizes the role of women in development (Donais et al., 2016, p. 292; Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012; Hudson, 2005). Indeed, the likeliness for significantly different gendered impacts and outcomes in PBSB under a liberal feminist framework are limited in scope or not possible at all (Hudson, 2005; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Mosedale, 2014).

Standpoint feminism challenges the essentialism of liberal feminism by calling for gender (as opposed to women) as a category for analysis in and of itself (Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014). However, reductionist interpretations of women’s experiences in PBSB through standpoint feminist perspectives still prevail. Such that standpoint feminism regards “gender as constitutive,” the perspective places undue emphasis on women’s contribution “to political security and thinking” as naturally at odds or in complete disagreement with the position of men (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 53-55; Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014). Additionally, standpoint
feminism reductively circumscribes “what counts as feminist” by insisting that women theorize from the “standpoint of their experiences of gender, race, class, and other oppressions” as though femininity is inherently inconsistent with masculinity (Mosedale, 2014, p. 1118). Indeed, standpoint feminism is most visible in models that follow S/RES/1325, in which liberal feminist notions of women as ‘more vulnerable’ or ‘more peaceful’ than men are reproduced (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Furthermore, the presentation of women’s suffering as part of a homogenous global ‘sisterhood’ or ‘group’ under patriarchy further reinforces a “dichotomized universalism” which romanticizes the victimhood of women, reinforces men’s stereotypical domination, and subjugates or erases the overlapping security needs of people in the Global South generally (Hudson, 2005, p. 159; Mosedale, 2014).

Post-structural and institutional feminism are “gender-relational” approaches which call for a “radical decentering of biological explanations of social relations” and ask in what ways gender is made a meaningful point of reference when evaluating the vertices of state, security, and social relations (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 55; El-Bushra, 2012). In this way, false dichotomies of men as aggressors and women as victims can be avoided, or at least critically approached. Post-structural and institutional feminist perspectives have persistently rallied against these “so-called master narratives” by connecting diverse identities with individual experiences “in a particular location to wider regional and global structures and processes” (Hudson, 2005, p. 155-159). Post-structural and institutional feminism posits that implementing a feminist approach to PBSB is not “merely a matter of adding women,” but rather an opportunity to rethink “the way in which power functions to shape the world around us” (McLeod, 2015, p. 49). An emphasis on gender difference that is historically and spatially contextualized allows feminists in the Global South to investigate, recover, and produce knowledge on their own memories, conceptualizations,
and interpretations of conflict without Northern interference (Hudson, 2005; McLeod, 2015). Indeed, by emphasizing that people experience overlapping and contextually based realities in conflict, post-structural and institutional feminism challenge the “prescriptive nature” of feminist political commitment by questioning the degree to which traditional feminist frameworks reproduce “universalizing” and “exclusionary tendencies” in PBSB (Hudson, 2005, p. 159).

Where realists have been criticized for top-down approaches that fixate on state building, securitization, and economic reform, post-structural and institutional feminism better reflect the inclusivity agenda which calls to “reshape what peacebuilding is and how it is practiced” by procedurally including a broader spectrum of actors into PBSB processes (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Donais et al., 2016, p. 291). Though it can be argued that each feminist approach normalizes gender mainstreaming in development by varying degrees, post-structural and institutional feminism strengthen the rise of the inclusivity norm within PBSB debates by requiring that national and international actors first consult with the population, especially marginalized and vulnerable groups, in order to mitigate harm and achieve sustainable, peaceful outcomes (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Horst, 2017). Although the central exclusion of women and vulnerable populations is accordingly noted, an evaluation of the feminist paradigm commonly threading Somalia’s New Deal programming together has yet to be undertaken until now.

**Feminist Perspectives and Somali Identity**

It is important to note that although men and women may experience degrees of violence and peace in differing ways, liberal and standpoint gender analyses of conflict will often make cultural assumptions about the role of femininity and masculinity in relation to violence and peace: men as perpetrators of violence, and women as victims; women as peaceful mediators, and men as blockers; and so on (Okoth & Gardner, 2013; Oker, 2010).
Somali women and men embody a complex sense of identity, characteristically defined by clan affiliation, art and culture, and a relationship with their agricultural livelihoods. Somali women are often portrayed as one-dimensional victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), famine, and war. They are even portrayed as possible intermediary peace brokers between rivalling clan members with whom they share relations, such as their husbands and fathers (Jama, 2010). A lack of evidence showcasing Somali women’s historical contributions to peace-making may have intense implications for understanding the current context of women’s political engagement in Somalia. For this reason, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), through their 2015 Gender in Politics in Somalia (GENSOM) project, recorded the past experiences of Somali women in civic engagement, as well as their perspectives on their senses of identity today (EARF, 2017; Tryggestad et al., 2015). The research found that many women often described the 1969-1991 Barre Regime as the “Golden Age” for Somali women, since during that time women enjoyed increased formal political rights with the introduction of the “highly controversial” 1975 Family Law, which afforded them legal rights to inheritance and land (Mohamud, 2015, p. 3). However, clarifying that Barre’s regime before the onset of war in 1991 only benefitted some women, another group of Somali women found that young women today have access to a greater wealth of resources in the international fora, such as opportunities to attain higher education, start a business, or be involved in high-level political engagement (Mohamud, 2015). These narratives underscore the relations between power, discourse, political institutions, and structural violence within a specific time and space (Hudson, 2015). Indeed, they reiterate a post-structural feminist drive to resist privileging particular representations of identity, and instead give more energy to the socioeconomic mapping of the “international political economy of insecurity, violence, and peacebuilding” (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012, p. 147; Hudson, 2015). Moreover, understanding
gender norms – the attitudes and influence emanating from and being created by them – is central to any programming that seeks to achieve reconciliation in PBSB.

In this way, masculinity cannot be described as the root of “any particular conflict;” rather, it “interacts with other factors to produce conflict and violence,” where conflict is often “fueled by a legitimate sense of anger at oppression or exclusion” (Wright, 2014, p. 37). Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge and address these factors independently. Feminist Security Studies (FSS) would highlight that just as measuring gendered grievances of conflict is a critical factor in PBSB, it is equally important to understand how “protection is distributed between men and women” (Olsson, 2009, p. 45). Even when disregarding the notion that all groups will be protected equally from the “threats that affect their security,” there is still a central problem in assuming that men and women always “experience different degrees of quality of the same peace” (Olsson, 2009). For example, as Hudson evidences, “privatized security infrastructure such as high walls and compounds to protect aid workers shift from being metaphors for separation,” becoming instead “real infrastructure of rule with gendered impacts” which exacerbate North-South inequalities (2015, p. 416-417). To this effect, ongoing PBSB efforts that seek to strengthen gender awareness, reduce violence, and improve the protection of women and men need to avoid reinforcing structural divides between people, which inevitably fuel conflict. Certainly, a practical and in-depth perspective of the forms of peace that the international community “actually contributes” when “assisting with a resolution process” should be undertaken (Olsson, 2009, p. 54).

For the reasons above, the given success of a model following a post-structural and institutional feminist framework, where gender is a relational concept, could see productive PBSB initiatives in Somalia. Although it remains underutilized, as examined in the sections below,
consideration for and technical approaches to this model are gaining popularity (Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Somalia, The New Deal and Gender

A number of national initiatives exhibit Somalia’s drive to further include gender in PBSB processes in New Deal implementation. The 2017-2019 Somalia National Development Plan (NDP) is rooted in feedback from citizens attained via cross-country and e-survey consultations with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme. Separate and distinct consultations were held with youth and women’s groups in 2016, and recognition of their interests are specifically mentioned (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). The NDP cites the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and S/RES/1325 as priority documentation guiding Somalia’s PBSB goals, listing specific targets to reduce the incidence of SGBV by 20% by 2019 and increase women’s political leadership up to 30% by 2019 (Gardner & El-Bushra, 2017; Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). However, many feminist thinkers argue that Somalia’s New Deal implementation is frequently in line with liberal feminist perspectives, as indicated by its narrow commitment to improving women’s socio-political experience through the achievement of targets and quotas (Kumuyi, 2017; Horst, 2017; Donais et al., 2016; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

The NDP notably features allotments of funding disbursement from aid donors, demonstrating that although “more aid for development was disbursed in the period 2013-2015 than in 2005-2012 combined” (US$1.81 bil. for the former, versus US$1.78 bil. for the latter), PSG5 (revenues and services) received the highest funding at 45%, whereas PSG1 (inclusive and legitimate politics) and PSG2 (strengthen people’s security) received among the least, at 5% and
9% respectively (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017, p. 201). Although Somalia’s *Compact* – the “roadmap for reconstruction” – promises to “recognize gender as a cross-cutting issue, bringing tangible results to its citizens,” few or no tangible projects and indicators are provided to motivate donors’ interests in the attainment to this goal (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014, p.11-12). Moreover, the federal government and international donors are not the only actors with gender near the bottom of their agendas. Produced in partnership with the UNDP, the *2016 E-Consultations Report* and the *2016 Gender Progress Report* captured the voice of Somalis on PSG-related opinions and values to inform the creation of the NDP in preparation for Somalia’s *Fragility Assessments* (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Perceptions of the importance of women’s equality were relatively low: respondents prioritized the goal to ‘strengthen national financial and human resources systems,’ while ‘achieving gender equality’ was ranked as the least important goal by 90% and 65% of respondents respectively (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016).

Importantly, several feminist development practitioners and scholars have raised the issue that the NDP, Somali Compact, and Fragility Assessments were produced to curry favour among donors rather than to change state-society relations (Donais et al., 2016).

It is clear that the value perception of Somali women in social and political life needs to improve such that they are able to adequately participate in state formation and reconciliation processes (Horst, 2017; Fed. Rep. of Somalia, 2017). Somalia’s inclusion of gender in the New Deal needs to go beyond a liberal feminist approach that prioritizes the “mere attendance of women at consultations” and should instead strengthen the capacity of its justice system to address the historical and ongoing grievances experienced in conflict by its peoples generally (Kumuyi, 2017, p. 101). These grievances include, but are not limited to, SGBV, such that it is in line with an inclusive post-structural and institutional feminism approach (Kumuyi, 2017).
PSG1 Legitimate Politics: Changing Gendered Attitudes

Since 1991, the Somali people have encountered more than 90 local peace initiatives and reconciliation conferences, many of which have used traditional conflict mediation practices under the leadership of clan elders, Islamic scholars, and other key stakeholders (Oker, 2010). As evidenced by ongoing civil war, grievances among Somali individuals and clans still remain (Oker, 2010). Despite the reasons for the failure of reconciliation leading to sustainable peace – which are commonly a consequence of the political elite, warlords, and the business class problematizing concessions in order to maintain their own financial or political power – there have been instances where reconciliation processes have produced fruitful results (Oker, 2010; Kaldor, 1999/2006).

Standing apart from other reconciliation conferences, the 2000 Arta Conference held in Djibouti sought to achieve “country-ownership” by engaging a collaborative effort to end the civil war (Oker, 2010, p. 7). For the first time, warring factions, businesspeople, Islamic groups and the political elite were brought together to foster reconciliation and make key decisions for the future of the country (Jama, 2010). Although women were not initially invited, since they were not seen as significant civil society members, Somali feminist civil society activists were able to successfully convince then Djiboutian President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, to secure seats for women in the conference as observers and voting members such that the conference coincided with the adoption of S/RES/1325 (Jama, 2010). The Arta Conference also witnessed a “political breakthrough” where members agreed to establish an interim government, the Transitional National Government (TNG), as well as to adopt the “4.5 Formula” which secured proportional representation of Somali clans in government and reserved 25% of seats in the Upper and Lower Parliaments for women (Bradbury, 2009; Bradbury et al., 2010, p. 17). Due to these efforts, the number of women represented in parliament saw a 47% increase between 2012-2016 (EARF,
Consequentially, in May 2016, the Federal Government of Somalia agreed on the introduction of a 30% quota of seats legally reserved for women in both houses of the Federal Parliament (EARF, 2017). Despite these gains in high-level political office, there is still much to be understood about the majority of citizens’ access to political participation in the achievement of the inclusivity goal as per the New Deal. Although quotas and reserved seating in parliament may have benefits for some women or minority clan members, the extent to which their presence is translated into meaningful influence and power remains contested (Horst, 2017).

According to the E-Consultations, the majority of Somali men and women feel excluded: out of the 60% of respondents who stated that the political system does not allow or insufficiently allows public participation, 50% were women and 63% were men (EARF, 2017; Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016).

To that end, the NDP lists priorities featuring commitments to bringing peace through inclusive governance by means of deepening its partnerships with a variety of development actors (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Specifically, these partnerships include the first phase of the 2017 Joint Programme on Women’s Political Participation, Leadership, and Empowerment, implemented by the UNDP, the Somali Multi Partner Trust Fund, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), under the leadership of Somalia’s Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (UNDP, 2017). The project qualified to what extent the representation of Somali women in leadership positions was translated into meaningful influence, and also attempted to uncover the difficulties men and women face when trying to make a difference in a political environment, as discussed below (EARF, 2017).

Across literature, it is evident that women’s rights activists and women working in government are viewed as separate entities who do not share a common goal, and that there is
perhaps a culture of competition between them (EARF, 2017). Though Somali women lobbied for quotas encouraging women’s representation in government, the Joint Programme recognized that training everyday women to navigate through informal political structures could expand opportunities for them to connect across sectors and have positive outcomes for their general political participation (UNDP, 2017). Throughout Somalia, activities concerning women’s political participation were scaled up; civil society organizations such as the Quota Task Force, Nagaad Network, and the Somali Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) held three meetings per month for four months, attended by 123 participants from Members of Parliament and Cabinet Members as well as traditional elders and religious leaders who were sensitized on the importance of upholding the minimum quota for women’s representation in electoral and political processes (UNDP, 2017). Similarly, MOLSA trained 25 aspiring women diplomats on leadership skills and effective campaigning strategies in the city of Hargeisa, a number of whom later registered as candidates for parliamentary election (UNDP, 2017). In order to ensure the financial sustainability of the projects, an imperative requirement listed in the New Deal, the Joint Programme also reviewed the aid architecture between various donor and government channels to ensure the longevity of efforts that empowered women’s political engagement (Somalia UN MPTF, 2017). To achieve its objective, the Joint Programme used “different approaches from multiple fronts,” thereby reinforcing the notion within scholarship that donors and partners a) are able to make important contributions to changing constraining gendered attitudes and behaviours among the elite (male) class; b) can connect diverse groups of women together to expand their collective power and influence; and c) can provide relevant technical and managerial capacity-building training to ensure the longevity of such programs (EARF, 2017; Somalia UN MPTF, 2017, p. 10).
The Joint Programme set an unprecedented example, showing how women and men across varying sectors, class groups, and ethnic identities could connect, share resources, and expand their networks to realize sustainable political change with real results for reconciliation, inclusive governance and legitimate politics (UNDP, 2017). Although this project falls somewhat in line with liberal feminist frameworks that seek to increase the number of women in political office as a mechanism to increase their representational soft power, significant elements of this project point to standpoint feminism prevailing against liberal feminism and post-structural and institutional feminism in the broader sense of Somalia’s New Deal implementation. On one hand, the project assured the genuine empowerment of Somali women in politics and governance across community, regional, and national systems, as opposed to merely fixating on meeting arbitrary quotas in formal, high-level government. On the other hand, a deeper consideration could have been made to address the significant percentage of Somali men who feel excluded from political participation (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Indeed, a post-structural and institutional feminist framework would have treated the barriers being faced by Somali men in their effort to engage politically as those that occur along the same lines or in similar structures as the systemic barriers experienced by Somali women in conflict situations. The Joint Programme may have yielded different and gender-inclusive results had it comprehensively programmed for this reality. A deeper consideration for the unique experience of Somali men being affected by conflict is discussed in the next section.

**PSG2 Strengthening People’s Security: Somali Men and SGBV**

The *Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) 2015 Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Action* defines gender-based violence (GBV) as “any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will” during times of “conflict, displacement, and settlement,
in new communities and countries, and in the home by an intimate partner or other family member” (Glass et al., 2018, p. 2). Somalia’s New Deal Compact provides direct commitments to address challenges in regard to SGBV. Under their PSG initiatives, “the Somali Government commits to fulfilling its duty to prevent GBV,” and it has made the commitment to being “responsible for the delivery of security in line […] with a zero-tolerance on GBV, particularly sexual violence and exploitation” (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014, p. 6; Goodwin, 2014). Complementary to these promises made by Somalia’s Federal Government, donors have shown a keen interest and active engagement with SGBV in Somalia, and there is also recognition of the critical need for “guidance and recommendations on best practices for conducting research to rigorously evaluate these programs” (LOGICA, 2013; Glass et al., 2018, p. 2). For instance, several donors including the European Union, the Swedish International Development Agency, and Denmark’s Development Cooperative have actively funded several SGBV initiatives in Somalia through UN partnerships or other implementing organizations, but many “are still in the process of clarifying or re-orientating their gender priorities” so that the programming adds practical, realistic, and sustainable value to local Somali contexts (LOGICA, 2013, p. 10; Bradbury, 2009). Given the significant risk to SGBV experienced by women and girls in conflict situations, global and local organizations often collaborate to develop and implement interventions in response to SGBV and its prevention as it relates to femininity, often excluding men and boys (Kumiyi, 2017; Glass et al., 2018).

In FCAS, men and boys have been targets of systematic and extensive SGBV. They are threatened with death and torture, coerced to participate in militia groups, and have also been forced to “perpetrate and witness rape and other sexual violations against women and girls,” including their own female relatives (Okoth & Gardner, 2013, p. 2; Kaldor, 1999/2006). For
instance, in the context of ongoing conflict in Somalia, rape and sexual violence has been deployed by hostile clans as a specific tool utilized to destabilize and disempower rivalling local communities in order to exact power and control over them (LOGICA, 2013). In this way, SGBV is a multi-faceted family issue; in one specific example, hostile combatants raped women and girls related to husbands or fathers who themselves may have been the indirect or intended targets of conflict (Okoth & Gardner, 2013). Furthermore, women are raped in front of their husbands to “underscore the inability of men to fulfil their traditional role as protectors,” a tactic which exploits conceptions of masculinity and femininity that call attention to the economic and political circumstances which have made it difficult for many men to fulfil their traditional role as providers for their families (LOGICA, 2013, p. 9; Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Although gendered discourse about SGBV should encompass a human security perspective with respect to the harm it brings to social vitality (i.e. political, economic, and social damage) and deep material loss (i.e. death and human suffering), women’s organizations gravitate towards asserting the “brutal and extensive nature” of SGBV as it serves to reinforce women’s victimhood (Hudson, 2015, p. 416). Moreover, the standard of excluding men and boys in SGBV programming is in line with the exclusive and essentialist nature of liberal feminism (Hudson, 2015). In the face of crisis and insecurity, however, gender roles have shifted as men and women adopt different coping strategies to increase individual, household and community resilience. With a focus on women and girls, little is understood about how normative roles and expectations of Somali men have changed, and there is limited knowledge about how they have suffered in times of war (Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Unique among indices in its incorporation of a global quantitative analysis of gender, development, peace, and security, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security
(GIWPS) and PRIO published the inaugural 2017/2018 Women, Peace, and Security Index (WPSI), which reinforces the concept of gender equality as a critical factor for achieving positive outcomes in peace, social vitality, economic improvement, and state reconstruction (Klugman & Gaye, 2017). Although the WPSI makes note of conflict-sexual related violence as a crucial factor in understanding the case for PBSB in Somalia, it is not included among its index because of data restraints, thereby highlighting international development partners’ “fear” that SGBV cases remain unreported, and that survivors are largely on their own when searching for resources, perhaps especially men (Klugman & Gaye, 2017, p. 36). In fact, there is limited information or interest in investigation about SGBV violence in Somalia against men and boys, and the underrepresentation of their experiences in rape statistics is not uncommon. For instance, between January and September 2016, the UN verified that at least 200 girls and 1 boy in Somalia were raped by armed and unknown elements – perhaps clan militia, Al-Shabaab, or even UN peacekeepers (United Nations, 2017). Rape statistics and reporting on SGBV cast Somalia men and boys negatively and often generalize them as perpetrators of violence, which has huge implications for the ability to meaningfully engage men in SGBV PBSB planning in the future (Bradbury et al., 2010).

Ultimately, there is a need to look beyond the current levels of understanding and analysis that are congruent with liberal feminism. In essence, future programming for SGBV as a vital element for PBSB requires a larger integration of gender equality, as well as a broader consideration for the dynamic elements of Somali male identity and experience as per post-structural and institutional feminism. Not only will this allow men and boys the space to heal or discover and reflect upon the way they relate to women and girls, it may also be a critical step in enacting positive transformation in the conceptions of gender identity as a cross-cutting issue with the power to transform economic and political environments (Okoth & Gardner, 2013, Bradbury et al., 2010; Baranyi, 2008).
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) developed the Communities Care Program in Somalia, which was developed from the understanding that within the context of conflict and displacement, “there is an opportunity for positive change in social norms that support gender equity and decrease SGBV” (Glass et al., 2018, p. 1). The program’s theory of change intends to enact social transformation by increasing the “quality, access, and coordination of compassionate care for women and girls” who experience SGBV in FCAS by “strengthening community-based response and readiness across diverse sectors” such as health, protection, education, and justice (Glass et al., 2018, p. 4). Although intended to change social norms and empower community-led prevention for the benefit of female survivors, the project is still in its first mapping stage, and uses a participatory approach that invites local partners and key stakeholders such as religious leaders, traditional elders, clan members, teachers, health care providers, human rights advocates, business leaders and women’s organizations to participate in focus groups and individual interviews to “diagnose social norms that sustain SGBV” (Glass et al., 2018, p. 3). In the methodologies section of the project, there is a distinct reference to including male respondents as key participants in achieving project results (Glass et al., 2018). Though the project is directed towards improving community-led SGBV programming outcomes for women, there is still much to be done about emphasizing men’s victimhood, and not just keeping stock of them as project ‘blockers.’ Although the project exhibits more elements from a standpoint feminist perspective, the project in its first phase sets out to engage with male participants more fully in order to identify attitudes and perceptions towards SGBV, thereby making the program unique among other programs conducted previously. With a commitment to being a useful reference for global and local stakeholders interested in implementing and evaluating future SGBV prevention and response programs in Somalia, perhaps later project stages of the country’s New Deal
implementation could expand upon the role of men and boys such that they are acknowledged as victims and survivors of SGBV in their own right.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In the same way that violence and war devastate development, post-conflict periods provide opportunities for which PBSB can realize gender inclusiveness into the fabric of their creation, sustenance and permanence. Given a detailed look into the international documentation pertaining to the New Deal, the literature and evidence coming from Somalia and scholarship represents a refreshed commitment to gender equality generally, with greater potential for a dramatic shift to occur from liberal and standpoint perspectives to those of post-structural or institutional feminist PBSB paradigms. In achieving New Deal implementation, governmental and international approaches for PBSB interventions require investments in research to find solutions that best support the social, economic and political priorities of local contexts. In this way, a gender approach to state-building, one that follows a post-structural or institutional feminist model in considering the unique and specific contexts of how people relate to one another and how they act within their society, would “bring it down to earth” (El-Bushra, 2012, p. 11). However, the international fora have largely followed theories of governance, security, development, and gender that rely on external drivers of change (Baranyi, 2008; Zuern, 2009). The divergence between local ideas and western models of governance, or an idea of “state,” has often meant that the institutions created are not country-owned and are therefore unsustainable (Samuels, 2010, p. 86; Zuern, 2009). With a holistic understanding of local perspectives, Somali women and men need to be understood as economic and political actors with a rich history of mobilizing for peace and who have accomplished real and impactful results. For instance, in legitimizing their own political identities, women have engaged in political reform to achieve high-level representation in politics,
a success many FCAS have yet to achieve at a comparable scale. Although international development organizations have traditionally considered women’s representation in offices of elected representatives the endpoint of what inclusive governance should look like, there have been calls to question whether representation truly results in influence and power, and if not, what inclusive political programming could look like if this were a priority.

Similarly, although SGBV is often considered a violent action experienced by women that is perpetrated by men, little work has been done to understand the realities of both Somali women and men in view of this cross-cutting issue. In both cases, deepening the analysis of people’s experiences, attitudes, and perspectives from a post-structural and institutional feminist perspective can result in a better understanding for the drivers of gendered conflict and insecurity in FCAS. Although advancing the S/RES/1325 agenda can promote women’s rights generally, the PBSB process could be mutually enforcing for men if gender generalizations are avoided and addressed. Principally, reconciliation, healing, and freedom are agendas which underpin efforts to achieve human security, property rights, better management of natural resources and access to reproductive health. Gender inclusion in PBSB for New Deal and SDG16 implementation needs to go beyond quotas and must strategize gendered conceptions as they exist in daily life. It is undoubtedly important to recall that in the process of PBSB in FCAS, international development actors must accept that sustainable peace and development is predicated upon acknowledging that the impacts and causes of conflict are gendered, and that gender-sensitive approaches can instigate “more permanent” metamorphosis in the prevailing social norms that normalize violence and unequal distributions of power (LOGICA, 2013, p. 3-6; OECD DAC, 2013; Baranyi, 2008; CORDAID, 2015). As the international community and Somalia’s commitment to better engaging gender in New Deal implementation continues, perhaps there will be a more comprehensive
application of institutional and post-structural feminism, rather than wide usage of liberal and standpoint feminism.
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